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Husserl, the Monad and Immortality 
 





In an Appendix to his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis dating from the early 1920s, 
Husserl makes the startling assertion that, unlike the mundane ego, the transcendental ego is 
immortal. The present paper argues that this claim is an ineluctable consequence of Husserl’s 
relentless pursuit of the ever deeper levels of time-constituting consciousness and, at the same time, of 
his increasing reliance on Leibniz’s model of monads as the true unifiers of all things, including minds. 
There are many structural and substantive parallels between Leibniz’s monadic scheme and Husserl’s 
later views on the primal ego, and these points of convergence are laid out step by step in this paper. 
For both theorists, the monad is a self-contained system of being, one “without windows”; a monad’s 
experiences unfold in harmonious concatenations; a monad is a mirror of its proximate environs and 
comprises multiple perspectives; the unconscious is a repository of potential activation; and, most 
importantly of all, a monad knows no birth and death and hence is immortal. In his very last years, 
Husserl proposed a third ego level, below (or beyond) the mundane ego and transcendental ego - the 
primal ego. It is neither psychical nor physical; it permits the transcendental ego to carry out its 
constitutive activities, including the mundane ego’s birth and death in time; it is always in a process of 
becoming, and so it can never be in a state of only “having-been”, that is, dead: and hence the primal 




In an Appendix to Analyses Concerning Passive and 
Active Synthesis (APAS) dating from the early 1920s, 
Husserl makes a startling assertion about the 
immortality of the transcendental ego:  
 
Even if the presently ‘enduring’ unitary 
object or event can cease, the process of the 
‘enduring’ itself cannot come to a halt. The 
‘enduring’ is immortal … . This implies 
that the process of living on, and the [pure] 
ego that lives on, are immortal. … 
Immortality is now given as the incapability 
of crossing out the present that is being ever 
newly fulfilled. (APAS, p. 467)  
 
The present paper argues that Husserl’s striking claim 
is an ineluctable consequence of his relentless pursuit 
of ever deeper levels of time-constituting 
consciousness and, at the same time, of his increasing 
rapport with Leibniz’s model of monads as the true 
unifiers of all things, including minds. There are 
many structural and substantive parallels between 
Leibniz’s monadic scheme and Husserl’s later views 
on the transcendental ego, which points of 
convergence this paper lays out step by step. In a 
recently published collection, edited by Renato 
Cristin and Kiyoshi Sakai (2000), of ten papers on the 
connections between Leibniz and Husserl, individual 
contributions discuss a wide variety of topics, ranging 
from their similar approach to a logical model centred 
on concepts and meanings, mathesis universalis as an 
early version of formal ontology, the notion of 
monadic totality as a teleological and regulative ideal, 
and the function of the spiritual monad as an 
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internalized relation between subject and world. Not 
one of the papers in this volume, however, touches on 
the specific theme of the monad’s immortality. 
 
Husserl repeatedly cited Leibniz’s genius in inventing 
the notion of universal science, a model for what 
phenomenology as a transcendental discipline of the 
essential structures of consciousness could achieve. It 
is also well known that, after a certain date (around 
1911), Husserl often employed the term “monad” to 
characterize a well-defined picture of the trans-
cendental ego. Every commentary on Husserl’s ideas 
after the Logical Investigations (LI) mentions the fact 
that Husserl labels the transcendental ego as a monad: 
this is taken to refer to the idea that the ego is a self-
contained complex of being, that it has “no 
windows”, that it is an absolute self-founding origin. 
Without doubt, this is true of Husserl’s remarks on 
the primordial awareness of one’s own ego, but 
otherwise it is little more than shorthand for a long, 
complex argument. What we need in an analysis of 
Husserl’s use of “monad” in his argument about the 
essence, genesis and structures of consciousness is 
not some kind of shorthand but the longhand version. 
My central claim in this paper is that there is a rich, 
complex parallel development in Husserl’s use of the 
concept of monad, especially in the Analyses 
Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis and some 
late texts from the third volume of his papers on The 
Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity (HUA XV, pp. 
608-610) which exactly matches, point for point, 
Leibniz’s development of the concept of monad. And 
this parallel includes, surprisingly, Husserl’s little-
known claim that a complete phenomenological 
account of the community of monads is built from the 
ground up according to a divine perspective. Husserl 
himself said that the 1925 seminar was concerned 
with “the ultimate foundations of a systematic 
phenomenology of world-constitution, showing from 
below how God constitutes the world” (quoted by 
Hart, 2004, p. 149). 
 
The next section provides a synopsis of the 
development of the concept of the monad in Husserl’s 
thought from his lecture courses in 1910-11 to his 
papers on passive synthesis in the late 1920s. This is 
followed by a focus on, firstly, the functional role of 
the monad in Husserl’s analysis of inner-time 
consciousness, and then, in the following section, on 
the monad’s role in his analysis of intersubjectivity. 
The penultimate section deals with the active and 
inactive ego in the Analyses Concerning Passive and 
Active Synthesis, and the final section with details of 
Husserl’s argument for the mortality of the mundane 
ego and the immortality of the transcendental ego. 
One striking testimony to Husserl’s view about 
immortality occurs in Alfred Schutz’s memoir about 
his last meeting with Husserl, shortly before his 
mentor’s death, where Husserl had said that, even 
though he, the mundane man, will have to die, the 
transcendental ego cannot perish. In an unpublished 
manuscript dating from August 1937 and titled “The 
Temporalities of the Ego”, Schutz develops the theme 
of immortality in the context of what he called the 
“deceased partial egos”: upon the daily experience 
that we survive these partial deaths rests all our hope 
in immortality (cited in Barber, 2004, p. 65). I also 
argue against the accepted view that, whereas 
Leibniz’s monadic metaphysics requires God as the 
divine agent who institutes pre-established harmony 
amongst all things, there is nothing like that in 
Husserl’s thought. To the contrary, in a 1926 letter to 
one of his former students, Husserl characterizes the 
lecture course on association, affection and time-
consciousness as concerned with, in these words, “the 
ultimate foundations of a systematic phenomenology 
of world-constitution, showing from below how God 
constitutes the world” (quoted in Hart, 2004, p. 149). 
There are three things that must be kept separate 
when one tries to unpack what Husserl thinks about a 
human being’s relation to death. His statements about 
the essential finitude of human existence, that birth 
and death are ineradicable features of humans’ 
worldly life, can be reconciled with his declaration 
that the ego knows no birth and death, that the ego is 
immortal. 
 
The Development of the Concept of the Monad in 
Husserl’s Thought 
 
Husserl first uses the term “monad” in “Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science” (PRS/HSW) (1911) when he 
contrasts the unity of an enduring spatial-temporal 
object with the unity of psychic being. He says that 
the “nature” of the spatial-temporal world of bodies 
denotes the fact that things and events present 
themselves in experience according to various 
appearances. But, despite their variety in appearance, 
they stand there as temporal unities of properties, 
incorporated in the totality of one world that binds 
them all together, under one “objective” space and 
one “objective” time. These spatial-temporal things 
are what they are only in this unity; only in their 
causal relations to or connections with each other do 
they retain their individual identity, that is, that which 
they carry as real properties (PRS/HSW, p. 179). The 
label “unity” for real-world objects signals their 
denotation as “monads” (units), and their essence 
(“they are what they are”) in their relations to other 
objects confers on the one world a plenary character. 
When we turn to the psychical domain, he says, we 
find that it is “divided into monads that have no 
windows, which are in communication only through 
empathy”. By “divided” he means not from “nature”, 
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but divided within the psychical domain amongst 
themselves. There are many, many monads; their 
nature is not comprised by or through the causal 
relations that hold amongst them, but by their ability 
to appresent the other monads’ experiences (PRS/ 
HSW, p. 179). 
 
He continues: “a phenomenon is not a substantial 
unity and has no real properties; it knows of no real 
parts, no real changes, and no causality”. Nor does a 
psychical phenomenon have a temporal unity; “it 
comes and goes, retaining no enduring identical being 
that would be determinable as such in the sense of 
natural science … . It is simply not experienced as 
something that appears, rather it is a ‘vital experience’ 
… seen in reflection; it appears as itself through itself, 
in an absolute flow” (PRS/HSW, p. 179). What is 
implied by what Husserl here calls “vital experience” 
(Erleben) is an experience as it is lived through, 
consciousness in its irreducible first-person character. 
“Everything psychical which is thus ‘experienced’ is 
then … ordered in an overall connection, in a 
‘monadic’ unity of consciousness, a unity that in itself 
has nothing at all to do with nature” (PRS/HSW, p. 
180). The connections between natural things fall 
under the categories of substance, property, parts of 
wholes, change of state and causality – none of which 
categories pertain to the ‘objects’ of thought 
considered strictly as intentional correlates, nor to 
consciousness as the bearer of these intentions. The 
monadic unity of consciousness endorses one 
dimension of Leibniz’s ‘formal atom’ or simple 
substance: it has no real parts, it cannot be divided, it 
is not causal, but it does have a complex description. 
Like Leibniz’s monad, then, Husserl’s unity is 
organized in a hierarchy of levels of constitution, 
dominated by the unique character, the transcendental 
ego, which determines it as this individual. 
 
Moreover, Husserl goes on to say that psychical being 
is “a flow of phenomena, unlimited at both ends, 
traversed by an intentional line that is, as it were, the 
index of the all-pervading unity. It is the line of an 
immanent time without beginning or end, a time that 
no chronometers measure” (PRS/HSW, p. 180). To 
declare that consciousness is a monad with no 
windows, a self-contained complex of being, not 
bound by causal relations, and whose own “inner 
time” is without beginning or end, sounds like a clear 
echo of what Leibniz has to say about “spirits” as 
complex monads whose dominant entelechy (the 
mind) has an immortal nature. In their “Glossary”, 
McCormick and Elliston, the editors of Husserl: 
Shorter Works (HSW) (1981), define monad as “the 
totality of ego-cogito-cogitatum; the self as subject of 
consciousness, together with its mental acts or 
processes, and the objects strictly as they present 
themselves in those acts to the self” (HSW, p. 369). 
Dan Zahavi extracts from numerous indications the 
principal sense of monad as follows: “the ego in its 
full concretion, i.e. the ego in the streaming 
multifariousness of its intentional life along with the 
objects meant in this life and constituted for this ego” 
(Zahavi, 2001, p. 32). 
 
Two years later, in Ideas First Book (ID1) (1913), 
Husserl says that no real being is necessary to the 
being of consciousness itself. Consciousness and real 
being are not two co-ordinate kinds of being that, 
under the right circumstances, are related to or 
connected with one another. Only things which are of 
the same kind, whose proper essences have a similar 
sense, can become connected in a legitimate manner, 
that is, can be considered as proper parts of a whole. 
Mental processes which are immanent to 
consciousness comprise absolute being, whereas the 
causal processes of worldly things pertain to 
transcendent being. A ‘veritable abyss’ thus yawns 
between consciousness and reality. Consciousness 
considered in its pure sense must be thought of as a 
‘self-contained complex of being’, that is, an ordered 
arrangement of absolute being into which nothing can 
penetrate and out of which nothing can escape. On the 
other hand, the whole world of spatial-temporal 
things is, from the phenomenological perspective, a 
merely intentional being, in the derivative sense that it 
has being only for consciousness. The world, then, is 
an acceptance phenomenon, in that it is tacitly posited 
in all experiences; to make any claim for the world 
having being beyond that is nonsense. Consciousness 
is a system of absolute being into which nothing can 
penetrate, as Husserl says on several occasions (ID1, 
p. 93; ID2, p. 180; FTL, p. 208) While this would 
include, as well, any experience of other egos as 
subjects of their own experiences, problems 
associated with intersubjectivity occupied Husserl for 
the next twenty years. 
 
In revisions dated 1921 to his lecture course on 
“Basic Problems of Phenomenology” (BPP) (1910-
11), Husserl reconsidered what he now thought to be 
an inadequate attempt to explicate the empathetic 
experience of the other in his own lived experience. 
He had originally said that, when the reduction is 
performed, when the existence of all things including 
the lived-body is disengaged, all that is left is my own 
ego. This ego is itself engaged in positing, through 
empathy, other egos as centres of their own lives; 
other lived-bodies are indices for contexts of 
conscious activities, but only by way of a represented 
(projected) point-of-view (BPP, p. 86). But, ten years 
later, he felt that an important feature of the 
analogizing experience had been left out, namely the 
“fact” that every other I can exercise the reduction, 
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“yielding in principle the same for it as what it has 
yielded for me.” Nature, as the organized totality of 
bodies, is an index (or system of indices) for the way 
that things appear, and “so is of course every other 
point of space, every other point in the objective 
space of nature an index, namely, for a certain 
coordination of the subjective appearings of nature 
and their order, as they are related for each I to its 
zero-point in the lived body. And again, each 
objective temporal point … is an index for a definite 
lawful coordination that, so to speak, relates every 
monad to every other” (BPP, p. 155; CM, p. 117). 
Now, one may well remember that, for Leibniz, space 
was a product of the plenum of monads in their 
relations with one another; against Newton, who held 
that space was an absolute frame, like a container that 
provided every physical thing with its precise 
position, Leibniz held that space was a relative field, 
constituted by the sum total of every monad’s definite 
perspectives on other monads in its surroundings. 
 
Husserl continues: the lawful coordination that relates 
every monad to every other does so “in regard to 
completely determinate motivations and connections 
of consciousness that are correlative and intertwined. 
Any possible empathy is the ‘mirroring’ of each 
monad in the other, and the possibility of such 
mirroring depends on the possibility of a concordant 
constitution of a spatial-temporal nature, of an index 
for the respective constitutive lived experience, which 
index extends into all I’s” (BPP, p. 156, emphasis 
added). Leibniz, of course, said that every monad is a 
mirror of the universe; in other words, it contains 
within its nature a representation of the determinate 
relations that it has with other monads in its 
proximate environs. Such an exact mirroring in every 
monad is only possible if there is a perfect 
“concordant constitution” of the whole of nature, 
established by God’s institution of this world. The 
Leibnizian notion of spatial-temporal indices, each 
monad mirroring others, and so forth, is extended to 
the mode of communication between Husserl’s 
empathetic egos. “In the factual world”, he says, 
“embodiment facilitates the communication of the 
minds of these bodies, that is, the communication of 
all human beings with respect to their ‘inner lives’ … 
. Each particular stream of consciousness is 
something completely separate (a monad) and it 
would remain without windows of communication if 
there were no intersubjective phenomena, etc. This is 
also the condition for the possibility of a world of 
things that is one and the same for many I’s” (BPP, p. 
158). James Hart refers to a manuscript where Husserl 
is inclined to see the inner-worldly events of birth and 
death as transcendental “indices” for an infinite 
“trans-natural” mode of being of the monads, indices 
for a style of being for which the methods of 
knowledge of the world in principle are inappropriate 
(Hart, 1993, p. 32, note 20).  
 
The next set of revisions extends the Leibnizian 
model further, to the pervasive harmony amongst the 
community of monads. There must be some factual 
connection, Husserl argues, such that two (or more) 
monads can “accommodate each other”, implying that 
they can co-exist “in accordance with a rule 
impressed on both of them, and that they can 
encounter each other as minds through empathy and 
reciprocal understanding, and that they can mutually 
influence each other by mental motivation” (BPP, p. 
162). The form of communication between minds is 
“reciprocal understanding”, and the “influence” they 
exert on one another is by means of “mental 
motivation”, which Husserl always distinguishes from 
causal interaction. Leibniz held that efficient causes 
operate across bodies, whereas final causes (that is, 
reasons or motives) operate across minds. “In its 
existence”, Husserl says, “each monad is not 
dependent on the other monads. Each monad would 
continue to exist, and the I would remain this I, even 
if the world ceased to exist … . To that extent Leibniz 
is right when he says that the monads correspond to 
the Cartesian rigorous concept of substance … a 
being is independent if it is demonstrated that changes 
in the one substance do not intrinsically require 
changes in the other” (BPP, p. 162). Although each 
monad is ontologically independent of every other 
thing, in their communicative exchange they must 
still be in accord with each other’s point of view. 
Husserl poses a rhetorical question in this concluding 
statement regarding the possibility that “in the 
absolute one, monadic being is independent from 
every other, for although each monad is essentially an 
independent substance, must they not, as facts, be in a 
relation to one another, in ‘harmony’. And that leads 
again to a common world and to nature in the first 
place” (BPP, p. 163). In another late text he says that 
monadic generations “realize special functions in the 
harmony of God’s world” (HUA XV, p. 610). 
 
The Monad’s Role in Husserl’s Analysis of Inner-
Time Consciousness 
 
Consciousness is constituted with past and future 
horizons; due to these temporal horizons, it cannot be 
simply given in the present; the concept of the 
“present” has to be widened to an “elastic” now. 
Time-consciousness is not merely constituted, it is 
self-temporalizing; consciousness as time-constituting 
is not “in” the Now, nor “in” the past or future. 
Rather, it belongs to its temporal phases as it 
constitutes them; as actively constituting, instead of 
constituted, it is not itself in objective time (PCIT, pp. 
74-76). Time-constituting consciousness is both pre-
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phenomenal and prior to immanent objects’ time; it is 
the very process of temporalization, and as such it is 
the “origin” of the past, present and future. Husserl 
says that this issue is “perhaps the most important 
matter in the whole of phenomenology” (PCIT, p. 
334). If this ultimate absolute, time-constituting 
consciousness, is pre-phenomenal, it must also in 
some sense transcend phenomenological analysis, at 
least as it has been presented, where the temporal 
dimension is shorn from consciousness. Husserl felt 
the need to develop a new level and method of 
phenomenological analysis, which he would call 
genetic phenomenology, and in doing so he felt the 
need to define and elaborate a new concept of the ego, 
the monad. “For Husserl, a monad is a being that is in 
temporal becoming or genesis, constitutes itself in a 
temporal unity of life as a structure of habitualities, 
and is ultimately a concrete ego, ‘individuated’ or 
‘factical’” (Steinbock, 1996, p. 33). 
 
Husserl defined a monad as a simple, individual 
being, “that is what it is as continually becoming in 
time”. It is not only what it is now, but is also what it 
is as having been in a living present, and transcending 
what it has been in the process of becoming (HUA 
XIV, pp. 35-36). He distinguished between the pure 
ego as timeless pole peculiar to static analysis and an 
ego as extended or enduring. Although the monad in 
its temporalizing process is not exhausted in a now-
point, this does not mean that it exists in a mere series 
of now-phases. “Rather,” as Steinbock elaborates, 
“self-temporalizing consciousness constitutes itself 
primordially as a unity of becoming in and through its 
experiences, that is, through its diverse living 
presents. The immanent time of an ego, asserted 
Husserl, can never be unfilled, have gaps, or fall apart 
into several separated streams leaving the monad 
fragmented in disjoined pauses” (Steinbock, 1996, p. 
33). This underlines Husserl’s later claim that it is 
monadic unity that permits the concrete ego to bridge 
long periods of unconsciousness, in sleep or stupor, 
and so forth (HUA XV, pp. 608-610). Husserl 
explicitly says that “In the monad everything is 
connected to everything else”; every experience is 
connected by virtue of the background or horizon that 
meets the demand of unity and temporal becoming; 
elsewhere he refers to its meeting the conditions of 
“harmonious unfolding”, an avowedly Leibnizian turn 
of phrase. Living through temporal horizons, the 
monad is constituted as “a living unity” that carries in 
itself an ego as the affected and affective pole, as a 
unity of capabilities or dispositions, as a unity of that 
which is concealed or unconscious (HUA XIV, p. 34). 
All of these predicates, of course, have Leibnizian 
parallels: the harmonious unfolding of a monad’s 
experiences through the unfolding of its inner 
programme; the monad as a unity of life-force, whose 
capacities are enfolded within its concept as 
dispositions to behave in certain ways. 
 
The monad is prior to being, Steinbock continues, 
“insofar as it is a process of genesis that makes the 
position of being possible … . Characterizing the 
monad as a living unity prior to static being implies 
still further that the monad is not simply a unity of 
acts, but a unity of affections” (that is, through the 
acquisition of habits). Husserl says that, “If the 
monad necessarily has the form of a unity of 
becoming, of a unity of an incessant genesis, then it 
has a concrete structure only from ‘elements’ that are 
themselves unities of becoming, and that have an 
abstract structure according to phases like the entire 
monad” (HUA XIV, p. 34). Steinbock interprets this as 
follows: “just as the elemental unities (living 
presents) are concrete in relation to its phases 
(impression, retention, protention), which taken by 
themselves are abstract, so too is the monad in 
genesis a concrete unity of becoming made up of 
phases that are unties of becoming (i.e. living 
presents, phases which in relation to the monad are 
abstract)” (1996, p. 35). Nicholas Rescher remarks 
that Leibniz’s concept of monad as an entelechy 
means that the dominant monad serves as the unifier 
of the whole by representing all of its parts through 
linkages. The idea of the two levels, and the idea of 
an entelechy, comprises not just the trivial point that 
composites require units because composites are 
pluralities, but the profound idea that composites 
which are themselves unified require true units to 
serve as unifiers (Rescher, in Leibniz, 1991, p. 51). 
The concrete phenomenal being for Husserl is formed 
from elements which are themselves unities, just as 
for Leibniz the composite being requires true units to 
serve as unifiers. 
 
Janet Donohoe summarizes Husserl’s last most 
mature time theory: “Husserl recognizes that even 
within the absolute flow of consciousness, there is a 
difficulty in assigning temporal terms to the flow 
itself. This suggests a need for an even deeper level of 
temporality that cannot itself be referred to with 
temporal terminology” (Donohoe, 2004, p. 56). “In 
order to explain the genesis of the manifestation of 
consciousness, Husserl must resort to other language. 
He begins to refer to a pre-phenomenal temporality, 
calling it the streaming living present. It is a move 
further than the levels of the impression, or the flow, 
that are present in his work from 1907-11 [PICT]. 
The streaming living present is urphenomenal, 
meaning that it refers to a constitutionality 
[constitutive activity] that is not temporal. It is an 
attempt to address the constitution of the temporal by 
the temporal. The streaming living present cannot be 
intuited because it is not phenomenal, it is pre-
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phenomenal. At the deepest level the absolute living 
present is not an atom, not a point, but already 
contains everything, even the whole world, in the 
sense of validity. It is the ego as well as the hyle, 
where the Ich and the Nicht-Ich are inseparable, 
where there is no distinction between subject and 
object” (Donohoe, 2004, p. 58; see also Hart, 1993, 
pp. 21-23). 
 
“Unlike the description of the ‘flow’ of his middle 
writings, the language of the streaming living present 
allows Husserl to grapple with the anonymous level 
that is pre-being, prior to an articulated, single stream 
of consciousness. In Husserl’s own words, it is ‘the 
pre-being which bears all being, including even the 
being of the acts and the being of the ego, indeed, the 
being of the pre-time and the being of the stream of 
consciousness as a being’” (Donohoe, 2004, p. 58). 
On some occasions Husserl calls this the ego-pole, on 
others the primal ego, which is not to be confused 
with the “primordial ego” in the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation. Husserl writes that, “on one side we have 
the temporal stream of consciousness and the 
transcendental ego of acts related to this temporality 
…. on the other side we have the primal ego as the 
primal ground of this temporalization.” Also, further, 
that: “I find indicated in this continual self-splitting 
and subsequent re-identifying of the ego an ur-ego 
which I will call the ur-pole, as originary functioning 
ego” (quoted in Donohoe, 2004, pp. 59-60). 
 
The level of the anonymous streaming living 
present offers us a position where there is 
limited separation between the I and the Other. 
In our regressive inquiry into the origins of the 
ego, we are faced with a foundational level 
that precedes self-reflective individuation of 
the ego in its concrete form. This suggests that 
the ego has a foundation that is not of its [own] 
making and that connects the ego to other 
egos, prior to the self-reflective individuation 
of any ego. With the streaming living present 
replacing absolute consciousness as the 
foundation, the question of intersubjectivity 
shifts its focus from an I-Other position to a 
question of co-constituted monads. There is ‘a 
unity of an absolute self-temporalization, the 
absolute in its temporal modalities 
temporalizing itself in the absolute stream, in 
the streaming living, and primal present, the 
present of the absolute in its unity, its all-
inclusive unity (!), which temporalizes and has 
temporalized in itself everything that ever is. 
Within this are the levels of the absolute: the 
absolute as an absolute human totality of 
monads.’ (Donohoe, 2004, p. 63, citing HUA 
XV, p. 669). 
The Monad’s Role in Husserl’s Analysis of Inter-
Subjectivity 
 
In the famous Fifth Meditation of the Cartesian 
Meditations (CM) of 1931, Husserl expounds an 
intricate, even tortuous, argument about the 
constitution of other egos within the sphere of the 
primordial, first-given ego. He says that “what is 
specifically peculiar to me as ego, my concrete being 
as a monad” includes intentional directedness to what 
is other than me. There becomes constituted for me 
what “goes beyond my monadic self-ownness; there 
becomes constituted an ego, not as myself, but as 
mirrored in my own ego, in my monad”, an other ego, 
an alter-ego. “The other … points to me myself; the 
other is a ‘mirroring’ of my own self and yet not a 
mirroring proper, an analogue of my own self and yet 
again not an analogue in the usual sense”, for it is not 
exactly the same, not given in the same way (CM, p. 
94). By this means, there occurs “a universal super-
addition of sense to my primordial world, whereby 
the latter becomes the appearance of a determinate 
‘objective’ world, as the identical world for everyone, 
myself included … . There becomes constituted a 
community of egos existing with each and for each 
other, ultimately a community of monads, which 
moreover … constitutes the one identical world”. 
Each of these other egos is “equipped with mutually 
corresponding and harmonious constitutive systems”, 
and thus “the constitution of the world essentially 
involves a ‘harmony’ of the monads”, as well as “a 
harmonious generation that goes on in each particular 
monad”. Husserl warns that this harmony is not a 
metaphysical hypothesis, any more than monads are 
metaphysical inventions (CM, pp. 107-108). 
 
The first and lowest level of community comprises 
my primordial monad and the other as constituted by 
me; the only conceivable manner in which any other 
can have the status as an existent consists in his or her 
being constituted in me as an other. All others exist in 
a community through their connection with me as a 
concrete ego, a monad; as such they are separate from 
me, a mundane separation that “takes place” through 
their occupation of other places in space.1 In their 
own being, “each monad is an absolutely separate 
unity”, and yet their reaching into one another is not a 
dream or a fantasy of mine; their intentional 
communion is an essentially unique kind of 
connectedness. “To this community there naturally 
corresponds, in transcendental concreteness, a 
                                                 
1 In a late text from the 1930s, Husserl says that “It is not as 
if each monad were for itself … and thus had being apart 
from the other monads. Rather, each one – insofar as within 
its being it has intentionally constituted the others (just as 
each one, in its present has constituted its past) – cannot be 
apart from the others” (HUA XV, p. 194). 
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similarly open community of monads, which we 
designate as transcendental intersubjectivity” (CM, 
pp. 128-130). In his summary, Husserl says that “our 
monadological results are metaphysical, if it is true 
that ultimate cognitions of being should be called 
metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here 
is anything but metaphysics in the customary sense 
[that is] a historically degenerate metaphysics.” 
Despite this proviso, he asks whether it conceivable 
that there could be many separate pluralities of 
monads, each of which constitutes a world of its own. 
He declares that this is an absurd hypothesis – there 
can exist only a single community of monads, the 
community of all co-existing monads. “Leibniz is 
right when he says that infinitely many monads and 
groups of monads are conceivable but that it does not 
follow that all these possibilities are compossible.” 
Husserl agrees, since he recognizes that “each monad 
having the status of a concrete possibility 
predelineates a compossible universe, a closed world 
of monads, and that two worlds of monads are 
incompossible” (CM, pp. 139-141). On the very last 
page, Husserl emphasizes that, even though 
phenomenology excludes every naïve metaphysics 
that works with things-in-themselves, it does not 
exclude metaphysics as such. Phenomenology does 
not “stop short of supreme and ultimate questions: the 
intrinsically first being, the being that precedes and 
bears every worldly objectivity, is transcendental 
intersubjectivity, the universe of monads which 
effects its communion in various forms”. It is within 
the factual, concrete sphere that all the problems of 
“accidental factualness” occur – death, fate and the 
meaning of human life (CM, p. 156). 
 
In other texts from the 1930s, Husserl insists that 
there are many levels of mediate and immediate 
experience that reveal the character of the other. 
Husserl describes “instinct” as the hidden drive that 
functions behind perceptions to reveal the subject’s 
insertion in the world. This instinctive drive arises 
from the sedimentation of decisions and beliefs which 
all together form an individual’s “style”; it is 
responsible for the awareness that precedes any 
thematized encounter with the world. The ego is 
driven to constitute a variety of unified objects out of 
its sensory perceptions and affections. But, beyond 
the individual instinct, there is a communal instinct 
which results from inherited traditions; it is based on 
empathy with other egos and their affections. “There 
is a pre-connectedness of egos that does not depend 
upon active constitution of intersubjectivity, but is a 
passive connection functioning prior to the active 
constitution, prior to the ego’s self-reference” 
(Donohoe, 2004, p. 99). This instinctive intentionality 
suggests a connection between the ego and the other 
at the most primal level, a connection that does not 
cease with the ending of any particular ego. Husserl 
says that, when an individual dies, “it does not lose its 
inheritance, but rather sinks into absolute sleep. Even 
then it functions somehow in the totality of monads, 
but this sleep cannot be converted into awakeness as 
would the periodic sleep of human existence. It could 
only happen if this monad appears in the functional 
context of the human organism and has given to it the 
specific monad development as specific inheritance, 
that of this worldly human being” (Donohoe, 2004, p. 
99, citing HUA XV, pp. 609-110).  
 
The Active and Inactive Ego in the Analyses 
Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis 
 
Near the beginning of Analyses Concerning Passive 
and Active Synthesis, Husserl makes an important 
distinction between the wakeful and the unwakeful 
ego by rejecting various concepts of the ego, each of 
which could be labelled with a conceit (or metaphor). 
“In the course of our psychic life, waking life is only 
one type; there is another one besides this one, deep 
dreamless sleep, unconsciousness” (APAS, p. 16). The 
contrast between waking life and sleep is drawn along 
the line of an active ego that carries out specific 
cognitive functions, such as attending, inferring, 
valuing, wishing, willing, and so forth. Where the ego 
is the peculiar centre of the experience, it is the one 
absorbed in it, the one suffering. The wakeful ego is 
“everywhere living in these acts as carrying them 
out”; it is in all cases related through an intentional 
act to its object. Husserl prefers to describe the ego as 
a pole or centre: “it can be manifest in them as their 
outward radiating or inward radiating point, and yet 
not in them as a part or piece” (APAS, p. 16). In a 
well known image, Leibniz compared the monad to a 
mathematical point through which any number of 
lines or rays could be drawn. A monad has no spatial 
parts and no dimensions; it does not occupy space, 
although lines produced from its extension do bound 
planes, and planes extended from planes bound 
regions of space. It is like a formal atom (that is, the 
“form” of an atom as indivisible), but unlike a 
material atom, in that a monad is not composed of 
stuff. It is a unit of force where “force” is conceived 
in life-like terms; hence, he sometimes calls a basic 
monad a “soul” because the basic meaning of “soul” 
(anima) is life-force (Leibniz, 1714/1991, pp. 53, 62).  
 
What is so striking about the parallel between 
Husserl’s and Leibniz’s respective images of the ego 
is not just the decision of both to call it a pole or 
centre, but that the contrast between waking ego and 
unwaking ego is drawn in the same way by both. 
“Wakeful life”, Husserl says, “has a background of 
non-waking, constantly and with eternal necessity.” 
For the ego to be awake means for it to be conscious 
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of the acts it is carrying out; such reflective, second-
order awareness indicates an active ego. For the ego 
to not be awake means not that it is “asleep” or 
“unconscious” in the ordinary sense, but rather that it 
is not actively engaged in its conscious acts. It is as 
though the ego were in “neutral” instead of in “drive” 
or “reverse”, not that the engine is not running. So 
Husserl says that the ego is not “awake” when it is 
“lost” in memory or daydream or in any other of its 
as-if modes of consciousness. The parallel with 
Leibniz’s concept of the unconscious is underscored 
by the fact that both thinkers view the contrast 
between one state and the other as one of degree. 
There is a continuum between unconscious and 
conscious, where the vivacity of impressional 
contents increases in one direction and decreases in 
the other (APAS, pp. 216-221). Life is ascribed to the 
waking, active ego and un-life (or non-life) to the 
unwaking, inactive ego. 
 
Sleeping and waking now have two senses for 
Husserl, just as they do for Leibniz. Sleep in the 
ordinary sense is a non-conscious state of a still living 
being, but sleep in the restricted sense is a non-active 
state of a still conscious being. Leibniz says that 
monads know no real birth or death, that phenomenal 
death is just a sleep, an infimum (an inferior order) of 
monadic life-force which continues forever. In one 
letter to Arnauld in 1687, Leibniz declares that “sleep, 
which is an image of death, ecstasy, envelopment, 
resuscitation [and other events] … all these things 
serve to confirm my opinion that these different states 
differ only in degree” (in Leibniz, 1991, p. 241). In a 
late text from 1702, he says, “in dreams and 
unconsciousness nature has given us an example 
which should convince us that death is not a cessation 
of all functions but only a suspension of certain more 
noticeable ones” (in Leibniz, 1991, p. 77). Lest it 
seem that my attempt to draw this parallel is too 
strained, here is what Husserl himself says: 
“Phenomenology confirms Leibniz’s distinction 
between sleeping and wakeful monads, which have a 
consciousness in a particular sense, and the spiritual 
human monads. It is also a truth to be confirmed that 
each higher level includes the others in a certain way. 
The human contains in itself an other animal soul-life 
and in the structure at the deepest level of sleeping 
monads” (quoted in Hart, 1993, p. 32, note 21). 
 
Husserl continues his expansion of the wakeful-
conscious and unwakeful-unconscious theme in these 
words: “only upon awakening does the sun of the 
central ego, as the radiating centre of actual acts, first 
dawn in the stream of consciousness, and only now 
are the memorial experiences transformed into those 
that are centred in the current present ego” (APAS, p. 
596). Husserl here makes rare use of a metaphor: the 
“sun” provides light for the wakeful ego, the sun 
which “dawns” as consciousness is awakened. This 
metaphor is extended when he describes the general 
background consciousness of our past into which all 
retentions eventually slip away as “sheer nightfall” 
(APAS, p. 221). Husserl’s unusual concept of the 
unconscious is built around the twofold sense of 
affection and the streaming away of retentions into 
the past. With regard to the important concept of 
affection, he argues that sensible features of objects 
exert an “allure” (reiz) on the ego; this affective force 
draws the ego to turn toward the object, such that one 
passing phenomenon releases another by way of its 
sense. Its allure functions as an operative “reason” (or 
motive) for the ego; it awakens the ego’s interest 
which then turns its own affective force in other 
directions, through “associative intentions” (APAS, 
pp. 196-200). Husserl says that “an intuition never 
disappears without a trace after it has elapsed. We are 
still conscious of what it had intuited, now in a non-
intuitive way; to be sure, in the end it fades away in a 
general undifferentiated emptiness” (APAS, p. 114). 
The general horizon of forgetfulness has become 
“lifeless”, in the special sense of not being carried out 
by an active ego regard (APAS, p. 123). 
 
The unconscious is “the nil of the vivacity of 
consciousness, but it is not nothing” (APAS, p. 216). 
Husserl’s use of the terms “force” and “vivacity” 
may, on first blush, remind one of Hume’s criteria for 
distinguishing an impression from an idea; but, 
strictly speaking, “vivacity”, in Husserl’s lexicon, is 
another way of stating “liveliness” or “aliveness”, that 
is, the ego as wakefully active. It is not nothing, he 
continues, in the sense of not-being, but rather 
“almost nothing” with respect to its degree of 
affective force. Hence it is not zero either, a term that 
would indicate a permanently empty content; the 
affective force is always above zero (APAS, p. 216). 
“Every concrete datum of the sphere of the living 
present is submerged in the phenomenal past, it 
succumbs to retentional transformation and thereby 
necessarily leads into the region of affective nullity 
into which it is incorporated” (APAS, p. 216). Leibniz 
explicitly stated that consciousness of its own past 
provides identity of self for “spirits”, that is, mindful 
beings. “An immaterial being cannot be stripped of all 
perception of its past existence. It retains impressions 
of everything which has happened to it, and even has 
presentiments of everything that will happen to it … . 
It is this continuity and interconnection of perceptions 
which make someone really the same individual. So it 
is unreasonable to suppose that memory should be 
lost beyond any possibility of recovery [even after 
death], since insensible perceptions … serve a 
purpose here too – preserving the seeds of memory” 
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(Leibniz, 1765/1996, p. 239).2 
 
Husserl continues that affective force can become 
“dead”, the opposite of “alive”: “for affective force is 
the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic 
connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to 
zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity” (APAS, 
p. 219). All retentions fade away further and further 
into an undifferentiated, cloudy horizon: the memorial 
past that is “less and less articulated” (no longer 
separable into discrete members) and that “coalesces 
more and more closely” (where temporal phases 
begin to merge together). In the more distant past, a 
particular tone, with its original temporal index, 
becomes less and less distinguishable from other 
remembered occurrences of the same tone. That 
particular tone’s connection with other sensory givens 
becomes lost: “no affective pull proceeds from this 
unity”. Although it is an essential characteristic of the 
passive synthesis of objects to be able to unite a 
manifold of aspects in one object, the retentional 
regress ultimately leads (at the zero-stage) to an 
inability to carry out this synthesis again, that is, to 
reproduce it. “But insofar as it contains the objective 
sense … we can say from the standpoint of the object: 
less and less becomes affective from it. And when 
there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, 
then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer 
nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the 
unconscious” (APAS, p. 221). Thus, Husserl’s image 
of the sun dawning as a presentation is awakened has 
its counterpart; where the original presentation can no 
longer be awakened, it passes into darkness and night 
closes over it. 
 
As the retention becomes completely obscure, “the 
final remainder of vivacity is lost in the streaming 
process”; but what is essential to the process itself is 
preserved. There is “a never-ending typicality: the 
primordially instituting process of ever new sense-
objects goes on and on ineluctably at the head of the 
living present.”3 This primordial temporalizing 
process is bound to the lawful form of the entire 
object-like structure; the process begins again and 
again in each successive now moment, “whose 
momentary givens immediately crystallize as co-
existent objects and are systematically articulated. 
These formations are continuously modified in 
                                                 
2 Personal individuality extends via memory into an 
immortal state: “Granting that the soul is a substance and 
that no substance perishes the soul then will not be lost, as 
indeed nothing is lost in nature … . Immortality without 
recollection is ethically quite useless, for it is inconsistent 
with reward and punishment” (Leibniz, 1991, pp. 103-105). 
3 Here “ineluctable” means something useless to struggle 
against, there is no going against the current; and “at the 
head” means at the origin or source of a stream. 
retention – since new retentions in succeeding them 
can confer new senses upon them – but this 
retentional modification leads further and further into 
the nil” (APAS, p. 226). Again, Husserl addresses the 
meaning of the concept of “nil” as not-nothing: he 
declares that it is “the constant reservoir of objects 
that have achieved living institution in the process of 
the living present. In it they are tucked away from the 
ego, but quite at its disposal.” To say that these 
distantly retained objects are “tucked away” is 
another way to express the idea of implicit 
containment (“implicit” as in “folded-into”) or, in 
another phrase, they are “concealed but can be 
disclosed” (APAS, p. 222). Once again, this is 
remarkably similar to Leibniz’s idea that the “shapes” 
(i.e. essential properties) of every individual are 
“folded” or “enveloped” within its concept and that 
its “development” is literally a process of stage-wise 
unfolding (see, for example, Leibniz, 1714/1991, pp. 
81, 95, 210, 213, 229).4 In Leibniz’s view, the history 
of each composite thing is the unfolding of its 
constituent monads’ own inner natures. Each monad 
has an internal programme, designed to run through a 
very precise sequence of stages, and since a 
composite thing’s particular profile or aggregate 
shape is the “result” of a dominant monad’s 
organization of its subordinate monads, its entire 
history is contained in its concept. Thus, a composite 
thing’s perceptions at any given time and place are, 
strictly speaking, the consequences of its principal 
monad’s internal phase of development. 
 
Every object’s original being, Husserl continues, 
consists in its being experienced in an originary 
manner: in the unconscious, one and the same object 
is no longer “constantly vivacious”, it no longer 
exerts its former affective force, “but the sense is still 
implicitly there in a ‘dead’ shape; it is only without 
streaming life” (APAS, p. 227). It is “dead”, of course, 
because it is no longer “active” in constituting new 
experiences. “Every accomplishment of the living 
present [an object’s sense] … becomes sedimented in 
the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizonal 
sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of 
sedimentation. While at the head, the living process 
receives new, original life, [while] at the feet, 
everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition 
of the retentional synthesis becomes steadily 
sedimented.” Objects’ original senses are not literally 
dead in the unconscious, but dormant, in a sleep-like 
state, one from which they can be awakened, made 
actively constitutive again. “One is only acquainted 
with sleep by waking up – so too here” (APAS, p. 
                                                 
4 The concept of the baroque fold is discussed at great 
length by Deleuze (1993, pp. 3-26, 85-99), and explicitly 
links Husserl with Leibniz  (pp. 107-109). 
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227). In an unexpected, strange way, these comments 
about sleep and waking, when given their peculiar 
glosses by Husserl, provide a fulcrum for his claim 
about the transcendental ego’s immortality. If waking 
is an active, constitutive activity exercised over 
inactive, dormant contents streaming away into the 
unconscious, if zero-point inactivity is death and 
expectant activity is life, then one can never wake up 
from being awake. The transcendental ego is always 
in a process of becoming, and so it can never be in a 
condition or state of “having-been” – that is, “dead”. 
The transcendental ego is what makes it possible for 
any thing, in its objective sense, to be able to wake; it 
does not create or bring about the mundane ego, but 
permits the ego to carry out its constituting activities.  
 
The Mortality of the Mundane Ego and the 
Immortality of the Transcendental Ego 
 
In Ideas Second Book (ID2) (1928/1989), Husserl 
raises the following question: according to an 
objective assessment of the thing-like qualities of 
things, is it not the case that how something behaves 
and how it will behave is predelineated by its own 
essence? “But does each thing … have such an 
essence of its own in the first place? Or is the thing, 
as it were, always underway, not at all graspable 
therefore in pure Objectivity, but rather in virtue of its 
relation to subjectivity, in principle only a relatively 
identical something, which does not have its essence 
in advance or graspable once and for all, but instead 
has an open essence, one that can always take on new 
properties according to the constitutive circumstances 
of givenness?” (ID2, pp. 312-313). In the Fourth 
Appendix to the Crisis of European Sciences (CES) 
(1936/1970), Husserl clearly links his concept of the 
individual not having an essence in advance, an 
embodied being that is underway and always 
becoming, to the core concept of an internal, self-
realized freedom – and, in doing so, clearly captures 
the Existentialist concept of freedom.  
 
This life, as personal life, is a constant 
becoming through a constant intentionality of 
development. What becomes, in this life, is the 
person himself. His being is forever becoming 
…. Human personal life proceeds in stages … 
up to the point of seizing in consciousness the 
idea of autonomy, the idea of a resolve of the 
will to shape one’s whole personal life into the 
synthetic unity of a life of universal self-
responsibility and, correlatively, to shape 
oneself into the true ‘I’, the free, autonomous 
‘I’ which seeks to realize his innate reason, the 
striving to be true to himself, to be able to 
remain identical with himself as a reasonable 
‘I’. (CES, p. 338)  
James Hart quotes from an unpublished manuscript 
where Husserl declares that, if a personal I is to live 
true to itself in consistency, there must be a nature in 
which is evident a divine mind which prevents the 
cosmos from becoming chaos. Husserl states that “the 
human being can only be satisfied when he 
experiences also the ideal of his self as an absolutely 
perfect being and when he can realize himself 
actively in infinite striving. He must bear a god in 
himself” (quoted in Hart, 1993, p. 44). In fact, this 
striving seems to be linked to immortality when he 
says that the human monad is “immortal in its share 
in the self-realization process of the divinity. The 
human is immortal in the continuing effects of all that 
is genuine and good”. The human monad makes real 
its own inner perfection by striving for the good 
through a universal ethics of love: “in everything 
noble and good which I realize in me, I am therefore a 
realized god, a fulfilled will of god, mere nature 
which has become god, a fulfilled god – god as 
entelechy, god as energy” (quoted in Hart, 1993, p. 
29). One strand in this line of thought to be further 
explored is the possible influence on Husserl’s 
thinking of Franz Brentano’s lectures on medieval 
philosophy in 1917. Here Brentano developed “a 
peculiar proof” of the soul’s immortality based on the 
idea that the essence of human nature is to love God 
through striving to realize God’s will for us in our 
mental lives (Gabriel, 2004).  
 
In any case, the connection of Husserl’s idea of the 
personal monad’s realization of God’s will with 
Leibniz’s thoughts on this theme is abundantly clear. 
In his Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), Leibniz 
explicitly compared human spirits (or minds) to “little 
gods” in their own domain: “Spirits alone are made in 
[God’s image] … since they alone are able to serve 
him from free will, and to act consciously imitating 
the divine nature. A single spirit is worth a whole 
world, because it not only expresses a whole world, 
but it also knows and governs itself as does God” 
(DM §36, in Leibniz, 1991, p. 279). In a letter to 
Arnauld of 1687, he states that, while all things 
express in their nature the whole universe, animal 
substances express the world rather than God, while 
spirits express God rather than the world. God 
governs animals and other things according to the 
material laws of force, but spirits according to the 
spiritual laws of justice. As well as being the author 
of nature as a whole, God is also the monarch or 
sovereign of the universal society of spirits, which is 
composed of “so many little gods”. “For it can be said 
that created spirits differ from God only in degree, as 
the finite differs from the infinite …. the whole 
universe has been made only to contribute to the 
beauty and happiness of this city of God” (quoted in 
Leibniz, 1991, p. 280). And again, in New System 
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(1695): “Minds or rational souls are as little gods 
made in the image of God and having in them some 
ray of the light of the divinity” (NS §5, in Leibniz, 
1991, p. 288). 
 
Husserl returns to the theme of an always underway 
process of enduring in Appendix 8 §10 of Analyses 
Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: “Even if 
the presently ‘enduring’ unitary object or event can 
cease, the process of the ‘enduring’ itself cannot come 
to a halt. The ‘enduring’ is immortal … . It could be 
the case that the world does not exist … . In contrast, 
it is absurd [to say] that immanent being (the present 
being that is being constituted in the enduring) would 
cease. It is inconceivable that everything would come 
to halt and that then there would be nothing” (APAS, 
pp. 466-467). The present moment as present is 
always filled with some thing; that which is now 
present (a phenomenal event) comes to an end and a 
new now is filled with another event, but the process 
of filling the present does not come to an end. “This 
implies that the process of living on, and the ego that 
lives on, are immortal; nota bene, the pure 
transcendental ego, and not the empirical world-ego 
that can very well die. We do not at all deny the 
latter’s death, its corporeal decomposition, and thus 
the fact that it cannot be found in the objective, 
spatio-temporal world, its non-existence. To be sure, 
an unending futural time is not yet posited with the 
immortality of the ego as immortality is now given, 
namely, as the incapability of crossing out the present 
that is being ever newly fulfilled” (APAS, p. 467). 
 
James Hart argues that, for Husserl, the key word 
erleben should not always be translated by 
“experience”: in non-reflective self-awareness all 
experiences are indeed “lived” (erleben) but are not 
properly experienced. “Even in a stupor or death 
where there is no experiencing, there is the lived-
experiencing of oneself. The irrepressible process or 
‘whiling’ (wahren, also translated as ‘enduring’) 
cannot begin or come to halt because all beginning 
and halting presuppose its witnessing the ‘nothing 
prior’ or ‘nothing after’. Life may be content-less, 
shutdown, and bereft of all worldly apperceptions and 
hyle [sensory givens], but there is still the inexorable 
lived now-form. This inexorable process is precisely 
the foundation of the consciousness of time; as the 
living present it is the foundation of self-
consciousness, the lived-experience, at the heart of all 
wakeful life; and mirabile dictum even when we are 
comatose or dead, for Husserl, even then wird auch 
erlebt [there also is experience]” (Hart, 1993, pp. 24-
25; 2004, p. 154). 
 
One striking testimony to Husserl’s view about the 
immortality of the extra-mundane ego occurs in 
comments made by Eugen Fink in response to an 
invited lecture by Alfred Schutz at the 1957 Husserl 
Colloquium. In “The Problem of Transcendental 
Intersubjectivity in Husserl”, Schutz diagnosed 
several problems and “aporias” in Husserl’s Fifth 
Cartesian Meditation, specifically on the constitution 
of other egos through the appresentation of the other’s 
subjectivity. In his reply, Fink said that, where the 
transcendental ego must constitute others in their 
sense as “intramundane others”, “the finitude of my 
life as related to death also belongs, in a fundamental 
way, to this intra-mundaneity of myself and my 
fellow men. Can the transcendental ego die? Or is 
death only an objective fact which belongs to its 
objectivation in the world and which has no truth for 
its final transcendental inwardness? … . Is not the 
intramundane human situation under-determined 
when one does not keep in view such determinations 
of human existence as finitude, that is, the fate of 
death? Does this not concern transcendental 
subjectivity too? Here, then is a question” (quoted in 
Schutz, 1966, pp. 86, 89).  
 
Fink proposed an answer to the very question he 
raised: in late manuscripts from the 1930s, Husserl 
“arrives at the curious idea of a primal ego, of a 
primal subjectivity which is prior to the distinction 
between the primordial subjectivity and the 
transcendental subjectivity of other monads … . [He] 
also tries to circumvent the difference between 
essence and fact by going back to the primal facticity 
of transcendental life which first constitutes 
possibility and thereby variations and … also 
constitutes essences. … [He said that] there is a 
primal life which is neither one nor many, neither 
factual nor essential. Rather, it is the ultimate ground 
of all these distinctions: a transcendental primal life 
which turns into a plurality and which produces in 
itself the differentiation into fact and essence.”5 One 
                                                 
5 Dan Zahavi reviews some of Husserl’s texts on this issue, 
as well as Fink’s interpretation: with regard to Fink’s claim 
that, in his late mss, Husserl seems to have come to the 
notion of “a primal subjectivity”, Zahavi argues that this 
view is “in blatant contradiction to Husserl’s constant 
emphasis on the difference of transcendental subjects from 
one another”. Later he says that “we can state that when 
Husserl speaks of a pre-egoic level, he is in no way 
referring to an absolute pre-individual ground; rather, seen 
with more precision, it is a matter of distinguishing between 
various egoic levels … . Temporality is an accomplishment 
of the I in every way and the pre-egoic level is the level of 
the anonymously functioning I that has not yet been 
objectified through reflection … . Although it cannot be 
excluded that passages that could confirm Fink’s 
interpretation are to be found in Husserl’s Nachlass, such a 
train of thought is fundamentally alien to the Husserlian 
point of departure, and probably derives from Fink’s 
influence” (Zahavi, 2001, pp. 66, 73, 77). 
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is licensed to infer, surely, that the essence of primal 
life is not bound by the factual death of the ego 
objectivated in its mundane aspect, that death is one 
of the differences which is instituted by its mundane 
character. When Schutz replied to Fink’s comments, 
he recalled that, in Husserl’s last conversation with 
him, his teacher had said that “the transcendental 
subject cannot die” (Schutz, 1966, pp. 86, 89).  
 
In a brief memoir titled “Husserl and His Influence on 
Me”, Schutz recalled this last visit with his mentor in 
more detail. “At my last unforgettable visit with him 
shortly before Christmas 1937, he expressed the 
confident hope that his book, should it ever be 
finished, would be the coronation of his life work. 
Husserl was bed-ridden and suffered already from the 
disease which led a few months later to his death 
[April 1938]. I was merely permitted to see him for a 
short time. But he must have had a presentiment of 
his forthcoming end, for he explained to me that the 
fully developed transcendental phenomenology 
makes it indubitable that he, the mundane man 
Edmund Husserl will have to die, but that the 
transcendental ego cannot perish.” At Husserl’s 
funeral, Eugen Fink gave the eulogy, in which he said 
that Husserl was “someone who took up his 
philosophizing as commission and grace from God, 
and so from the outset he had removed it from the 
limited contexts where life, enclosed in the finite, 
anxiously keeps death out of view. Death was never 
for him the alien sense-shattering power that can 
suddenly cut short an existence caught up in self-
achievement as meaningfulness. To him death was 
always the mystery of life, the real fulfilment of its 
meaning. Just as the essence of righteousness refers 
beyond the earthly and points to the gateway of death, 
so the essence of life always seemed to him pervaded 
by death and in turn to pervade death itself” (Fink, 
1938, quoted in Embree, 1988). 
 
In an unpublished manuscript from August 1937 
(recently recovered by Michael Barber), titled “The 
Temporalities of the Ego”, Schutz develops the theme 
of immortality in the context of what he called the 
“deceased partial egos”. This is “more than simply a 
metaphor”, he wrote, “when we bring into connection 
with the ur-phenomenon of death these life-forms of 
our past ego that have sunk into the past and will 
never again see the light of day.”  
 
Death is no life-transcending phenomenon 
but rather a life-immanent one, a result that 
makes immediately visible in complete 
earnestness the problem of immortality. … 
The irreversibility of that time is identical 
with the inescapability of death. We cannot 
avoid that death, which constantly threatens 
our total ego in the now, our ego itself. In 
addition, we cannot elude those partial 
deaths, which concern basic attitudes of the 
most intimate layers of our personality, as 
well as the ego itself, which however will 
survive the death of those partial egos due 
to its ability to be always newly present as 
ego agens. In this experience of one’s own 
partial deaths lies a significance to be found 
within every death, which must befall this 
ego agens, the ego, my ego. … But upon 
the daily experience that we survive our 
partial deaths, upon this experience that we 
are only changed, rests all our hope in 
immortality, which takes from death its 
horrors and shows it to us as something to 
be trusted. (Schutz, 1937, quoted in Barber, 
2004, p. 65) 
 
Husserl clearly thought that the concrete, mundane 
ego was bound by birth and death, as manuscripts 
from the late 1920s and early 1930s indicate (Mensch, 
1988, pp. 156-158, 258-260). Here he says that “death 
pertains to the duration (Bestand) of the pre-given 
constituted world. In other words, death is an event in 
the world of humans, in the constituted world”. The 
constitution of a finite lifetime requires the 
constitution of organic bodies capable of birth and 
death, Mensch comments: “the sense of my own birth 
and death proceeds through the apprehension of these 
phenomena as pertaining, first of all, not to myself but 
to others in their embodied character”. The absolute 
character of the final horizon is tied in Husserl’s 
thought to the contingency of the world which the 
absolute grounds. “The horizon of the absolute is all 
embracing; as such it excludes the notion of 
contingency. The horizon of the world which the 
individual subject actually experiences is finite. It is 
something which the subject can only piecemeal 
experience and make actual to itself. The second 
horizon thus acts to conceal the first.” This 
concealment is simply a function of the self-
objectification of the absolute in terms of beings with 
finite experiences, ones with a beginning and an end. 
“All of the finite subject’s experiential acquisitions 
are regarded as contingent and relative. None of them 
has the stamp of permanence. This living … ‘in the 
consciousness of finitude in an infinite world’ is, for 
Husserl, the basic ‘structure of human existence’” 
(Mensch, 1988, p. 156). 
 
From the natural attitude, the presence of other 
subjects is taken as a simple given of experience. But 
from the transcendental attitude, “the being of the 
world in its infinite extent seems to involve the 
necessary presence of an indefinitely extended 
plurality of subjects to whom it can be given”. 
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Husserl expresses this idea of involvement through 
the dialectic of finitude and infinitude: “My life 
becomes a human life in the world ... . My life in its 
open infinitude is indeed finite in and according to 
objective spatial-temporality. It will cease as a human 
life in the world – I shall die.” Husserl comments that, 
of course, my birth and death are not personally 
experienceable phenomena, in that “to experience a 
beginning of experience as a beginning, one would 
have to experience what went before it. But before 
such a beginning, there is, by definition, no such 
experience available to me. The same holds, mutatis 
mutandis, for the case of death. The underlying point 
here is that ‘life and death are in objective time and 
limit the temporal existence of every human being, 
i.e. limit its human duration which, like every 
duration, has its relations of coexistence, overlapping, 
length and shortness, etc’” (Mensch, 1988, p. 157, 
quoting Husserl). The sense of life and death as 
events in the world can be given to me only in a 
mediate fashion, that is, as phenomena that others 
undergo. The worldly sense of my essential finitude is 
that of my having a finite access to the world, and this 
is inherent in my having a finite lifetime.6 
 
Husserl also holds that the ego lives on beyond its 
bodily death by way of the presence of the very others 
who provided it with its experience of death as a 
worldly phenomenon. According to a generative 
account, the other has priority over the ego, since it is 
only because of inherited traditions and sedimented 
habits that the ego has a sense of its own birth and 
death. The ego can make sense of its own birth and 
death because it transfers the experiences of others’ 
births and deaths “back into my own personal being 
which has already been constituted as a living entity” 
and is able to recognize then “its own human birth, its 
own human death” (HUA XV, p. 209). Since the 
constitution of the world whole extends beyond the 
individual ego, it is prior to an individual’s birth and 
continues after its death; but it is also prior to its 
proximate monadic community, and continues within 
it as well. Husserl argues that the sense of the world 
whole is a product of the constitutive activities of 
                                                 
6 Mensch likens Husserl’s discussion of “essential finitude” 
to Heidegger’s exploration of this theme. In one of his first 
books, Speech and Phenomena, Derrida contrasted 
Heidegger’s death-bound Dasein with what Derrida took to 
be Husserl’s immortality thesis (Derrida, 1967/1973, pp. 
53-55). According to Derrida, the relation of consciousness 
with presence described by Husserl puts one beyond the 
bounds of any empirical reality, and hence beyond death. 
Derrida claims for Husserl that the transgression of the 
empirical into the transcendental only putatively preserves 
being, since the relation with my death lurks in the 
determination of being as presence (ideality), the absolute 
possibility of repetition (see Sheets-Johnstone, 2003, pp. 
248-251). 
many subjects: “it transpires in a unity of tradition – 
this tradition that is constituted in the world itself 
beyond the pauses of birth and death of the 
individual” (quoted by Steinbock, 1996, p. 304). 
Without the accommodation of individuals’ births and 
deaths in a living ongoing tradition, every subject 
would have to constitute the world as if from a blank 
slate. “The individual ego is not just constituting the 
world from its own past experiences, but also the 
world out of a historical past. The historical tradition 
that is recognized due to the description of birth and 
death constitutes the sense of the world through the 
sedimentation of earlier historical sense formations” 
(Donohoe, 2004, p. 102; see also Hart, 1993, p. 31). 
 
Thus, there are three things that must be kept separate 
when one tries to unpack what Husserl thinks about a 
human being’s relation to death. Although his 
interpreters are not consistent – or at least not 
complete – about these issues, Husserl himself is both 
consistent and complete. His statements about the 
essential finitude of human existence, that birth and 
death are ineradicable features of humans’ worldly 
life, can be reconciled with his declaration that the 
ego knows no birth and death, that the ego is 
immortal. The way to understand how these claims 
can be reconciled requires a brief recapitulation of 
Husserl’s mature ontology of human being. In his 
very thorough discussion of this topic, D. W. Smith 
argues that Husserl advocates a monism of substrate 
coupled with a plurality of essences. An individual 
human is one thing which instantiates three essences: 
material (or physical) body, living-body (or flesh) 
animated by the soul, and consciousness as 
transcendental ego. Material things, as they fall under 
Nature, exist in space and time; as bodies they are 
space-time occupiers. Conscious events, on the other 
hand, are not real (they are irreal); they do not occupy 
space and time, even though they are temporal events. 
As a real human being, I experience myself as having 
a physical body, a material thing which occupies 
space and time; my material body is made of material 
parts; it can causally interact with other bodies. But, 
in addition, as an animal being, I experience my body 
as animated by my soul, and thus my bodily 
experience of the world is one that is lived-through. 
As a human person, I live in the world as a spirit 
insofar as I am a member of a community of other 
spirits in a moral, social, and historical world. As a 
spirit, I can understand others’ beliefs and actions as 
the ‘products’ of other beings like myself. Through 
my lived-body, I experience the world as something 
that can be the matrix of moving through space and 
attaining the goals of my desires. The human spirit 
depends on the human soul, which itself depends on 
the lived-body, and the lived-body depends on the 
material body. In reverse order, Husserl says that the 
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material body founds the lived-body, which in turn 
founds the human soul, while the latter founds the 
spirit or ego. 
 
If we employ these ontological categories, we can 
make the following inferences about humans’ relation 
to birth and death: Inasmuch as he is an organic living 
embodied being, a human is bound by birth and death, 
the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of life-force. 
Inasmuch as he is an historical, horizonal being, in an 
inter-subjective community, a human’s decisions, 
values and beliefs are – to a greater or lesser degree – 
carried on by successive generations. And, inasmuch 
as a human is a transcendental ego, an instance of 
consciousness as such, a human is not bound by birth 
and death. He (or it) is the primal ground upon (or 
through) which all phenomena are granted a 
beginning and an ending. So, when we consider again 
Schutz’s memory of his mentor’s last words to him, 
we can better understand what he meant: Edmund 
Husserl, the person, the old man, will die, whereas 
Husserl the thinker lives on in the thoughts of 
innumerable students of phenomenology. But, even 
then, this is not what Husserl was trying to convey to 
Schutz – that the transcendental ego as such is 
immortal, and, in this sense, it thus cannot die. 
 
Let us return to the point where we broke off earlier, 
where Husserl had said that the transcendental ego 
was immortal insofar as there is “an incapability of 
crossing out the present that is being ever newly 
fulfilled” (APAS, p. 467). He had said that the 
transcendental ego has “an endless life with an 
endless immanent temporal form on both sides” 
(APAS, p. 454). He does not mean that the ego, any 
aspect of the ego, lives without limit, without an end 
in objective time. An “endless life” means that there 
is no point where in reflection the active ego will not 
find an ego acting. Both backward and forward, the 
ego can always identify itself as actively 
temporalizing yet another past or future sequence of 
now-points; that is, there is always another sequence, 
forever and ever. How so? Every remembered 
sequence of events is identical insofar as it has the 
same temporal order and duration; but it is also 
permanently, ineradicably, different as well. As each 
present moment passes, its just-gone now becomes a 
further point in a newly retained sequence. Every 
temporal sequence leads to the present; but, as time 
passes, each present is a new present, such that the 
original sequence now leads to that new present and 
hence comprises a further sequence which can itself 
be recalled. Each remembered sequence, as it joins its 
predecessors in a forever receding past, includes as its 
latest ‘member’ an act of remembering that whole 
sequence. And hence each moment becomes a ‘tile’ in 
a cascade of potentially infinite sequences, each of 
which enfolds every other enchained sequence. 
 
The living, immanent past is exponentially augmented 
by each new now’s potential to be both the first point 
of an act of remembering and the final point of a 
remembered series. The same is true, Husserl argues, 
for the future: each upcoming now-point joins a 
forever iterable series of projected sequences as the 
now point becomes just-past and anchors yet another 
forward expectation. He says that every present, as an 
enduring being, has a protentional form that cannot be 
crossed out, implying that a new now must arrive, as 
well as a retentional form that cannot be crossed out, 
implying that a just-passed now is replaced by a new 
now. Even if one were to posit nothing prior to the 
beginning of the process of endlessly iterative 
memories, that would presuppose something with 
which “nothing” could conflict. “There can be an 
emptiness prior to the beginning, an undifferentiated 
monotone, mute stupefaction [or stupor], but even this 
is something past, and has the essential structure of 
something temporal.” Birth is the name for the event 
of moving from not-yet-life to life, from no thing 
outside time to something within time. But the 
temporalizing process is itself the “life” of conscious 
being – or perhaps, one could say, what makes life 
possible for (or as) an active ego. Hence, it is 
inevitable that “transcendental life, the transcendental 
ego, cannot be born; only a human being in the world 
can be born. The ego as transcendental ego was 
eternal, [since] I am now and belonging to this now is 
a horizon of the past that can be unravelled into 
infinity. And this means precisely [that] the ego was 
eternal” (APAS, p. 469). 
 
Drawing near to the conclusion to this appendix, 
Husserl avers that “the necessity of an unending 
immanent time [is] the infinity of past transcendental 
life.” But this does not imply that the transcendental 
ego has always had a wakeful life. “Rather, a mute 
and empty life, so to speak, a dreamless empty sleep, 
is conceivable as a life that also had this necessary 
structure.”7 Except that, in this limit case, with an 
                                                 
7 Before its being alive, i.e. prior to its birth, the ego’s self-
temporalization does not occur. Birth is a transition from 
“primal sleep” to “primal awakening”: the primal sleeping 
ego is “that which possesses nothing as an existent and has 
nothing pre-given; it is, equally, an ego which is 
temporalizing nothing and has not temporalized anything as 
existent”. Husserl also says that the primal sleeping ego or 
monad is “nothing for itself”; but this does not signify that 
it is nothing in itself. As James Mensch phrases it: “to the 
point that the sleeping ego does not temporalize … it may 
be regarded as a life which is collapsed into its centre … . 
Stripped of its being for itself, its being in itself is its being 
in an anonymous original present”. “Death is the collapse of 
the wakefulness [and] a return to the egological state which 
existed before birth, i.e. before the temporalization which 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007  Page 15 of 18 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
affect of nil, a near-zero of intentional activity, “the 
ego did not come on the scene, so to speak, and the 
slumbering ego was a mere potentiality for the ego 
cogito”. The same is true for the future as well as the 
past – it is without limit, without an end. “The ego 
lives on; it always is and necessarily has its future 
before it … . There is a forward directed ‘always’ for 
me as the ego.” What is yet to come will be past after 
it is present and it will coalesce with the current now 
which will then become a past lying yet further back, 
joining as a new transient end-point everything that is 
now past. “Again, it is inconceivable that the trans-
cendental ego ceases. [This does not mean] that the 
human being has lived and will live for eternity, and 
that birth and death, the emergence of human beings 
in nature and their disappearance from nature, say, 
through creation or destruction, is quite compatible 
with the transcendental infinity of life.” Note well 
here that, in Husserl’s ontology, “human being” refers 
to the ego in its animate or psychic aspect. “Strictly 
speaking”, Husserl concludes, “the soul of the body is 
not immortal … and it actually perishes since it is a 
part of everyday experience. But in a certain respect 
every human ego harbours its transcendental ego, and 
this does not die and does not arise; it is an eternal 
being in the process of becoming” (APAS, p. 471). 
 
But perhaps someone who has followed the argument 
thus far might comment that this analysis pushes the 
congruence between Husserl and Leibniz too far. 
Aside from his naming the transcendental ego a 
monad, all the other terms used to describe it – such 
as “windowless”, “self-contained being”, “mirrored 
perspective”, and so forth – are only so many lexical 
accessories, metaphorical extensions. After all, as 
every commentator on the Leibniz-Husserl 
connection has declared, Leibniz’s monadic 
metaphysics requires God as the divine agent who 
institutes the pre-established harmony amongst all 
things, and there is nothing like that in Husserl. On 
the rare occasions in his works when Husserl 
mentions God, it is only as “a limit concept”, about 
which one can know nothing. Paul Ricoeur, for 
example, said that “in Leibniz all perspectives are 
integrated into a higher point of view, that of God, by 
an operation of over-viewing (survol) which allows 
passing from the monad to the monadology. No such 
view from above is permitted in Husserl. It is always 
from the side, and not from above, that each of us 
                                                                          
gives the ego its life. It is thus ‘the cessation of all 
conscious life and, with this, also the cessation of the ego as 
the identical pole of this life and the capacities pertaining to 
it.’ This is not a collapse into nothingness; it is rather a 
return to the now which is the independent origin of this 
life. What remains is the now which, in temporalizing, first 
resulted in the ego’s presence as a pole, i.e. a middle-point, 
of its life” (Mensch, 1988, pp. 259-260). 
discovers that the same world is grasped from 
different points of view” (Ricoeur, 1967, p. 133). Dan 
Zahavi agrees with this assessment: “Husserl’s 
monadic philosophy of intersubjectivity naturally 
cannot be seen as a mere resurrection of a Leibnizian 
conceptual heritage … it is not only because Husserl 
does not presuppose a pre-established harmony 
running through the monadological community, but 
also because this monadological plurality is only to be 
regarded from the standpoint of the individual I, 
rather than from God’s view from nowhere” (Zahavi, 
2001, pp. 79-80). 
 
These bold claims are just plain wrong. It is true that, 
in all 650 pages of the Analyses Concerning Passive 
and Active Synthesis, God is not mentioned once; but, 
in a 1926 letter to one of his former students, Husserl 
characterizes the lecture course on association, 
affection and time-consciousness as, in these words, 
concerned with “the ultimate foundations of a 
systematic phenomenology of world-constitution, 
showing from below how God constitutes the world” 
(quoted in Hart, 2004, p. 149). James Hart comments 
on Husserl’s insight that, despite all the discordances 
in experience, the world as a whole coheres: “there is 
no necessity in the cohesion of our experiences. The 
associative demands that found what we call 
motivation can be annulled at any time. … A totally 
chaotic confusion of the founding flux of hyletic data 
would make apperceptions impossible; the staying 
power of apperceptions would have to dissolve 
because there would be no corroboration … . What 
could expectation mean with a world of total chaotic 
confusion as envisaged by Husserl? … It is a fact that 
the world holds, but there is no fact that we can 
appeal to that will say it must hold”. Husserl asks how 
it is that one’s experience of an external thing can be 
continually joined to another in such a way as to 
constitute the unity of world-certainty. “Can it not be 
that an external experience is the last one, while 
consciousness endures?” To which Hart responds: 
“we know for Husserl that this endurance of 
consciousness is to be taken in the strong sense” 
(Hart, 2004, p. 151). Hart thinks that Steinbock, in his 
Introduction to Analyses Concerning Passive and 
Active Synthesis, is “incorrect when he suggests that a 
generative phenomenology would relativize this 
position and that we would attain a perspective that 
would account for successors and progenitors… . The 
original living present or primal presencing is not 
ever displaceable by any generative considerations. 
Any suggestion that the ultimate sense of the 
individuality of the transcendental I, not the person as 
somebody gendered, acculturated, ineluctably tied to 
others in the world, is constituted by any factors 
outside of itself is also incorrect” (Hart, 2004, p. 151). 
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On rare occasions, Husserl’s regressive inquiries, 
going ever deeper in uncovering the strata of sense 
constitution, forced him to confront a strange enigma 
– what he once referred to as “the irrational fact of 
rationality of the world”. He sometimes confronted 
head-on the “fact” that transcendental phenomeno-
logy, as an effort to make sense of the process of 
making-sense, never failed to find evidence that 
permitted constitutive activities to cohere in one 
world. James Hart says that “this ultimate realm 
Husserl regarded as a fact that may be called 
irrational insofar as every explanation presupposes it. 
Metaphysics has to do with ‘the problems of the 
irrational matter of all objectifying forms belonging to 
a world and puts these problems in relation to the 
teleological-theological problems that are designated 
by the title – the rational character of the world.’ … 
The transcendental sense of the world along with the 
community of monads is ‘a locus wherein necessarily 
ideas and the ultimate absolute values realize 
themselves stage by stage, as a locus of divine 
formative acts.’ … [He also] makes use of the term 
‘divine entelechy’ to elucidate this sense of the world 
and its formation in the [foundation] of the trans-
cendental I” (Hart, 2004, p. 152, quoting Husserl). In 
the context of his discussion of monadic community, 
Husserl’s recourse to an overarching rationality which 
“explains” the never-ending harmony of unfolding 
experiences, and his calling this ideal a divine 
formation or entelechy, can hardly be put down to an 
extended metaphor – it places his analysis squarely 
within Leibniz’s realm.  
 
There are many structural and substantive parallels 
between Leibniz’s monadic scheme and Husserl’s 
later views on the primal ego, points of convergence 
that this paper has laid out step by step. Of course, it 
is important to acknowledge that, for Husserl, 
“monad” is one way to refer to conscious being; only 
insofar as the transcendental ego founds the absolute 
sphere of consciousness is it called a monad. For 
Leibniz, the universe contains an infinite plurality of 
monads, organized into an enormous variety of 
aggregated individuals; only some monads are 
conscious and deserve the name “spirits”. But, if we 
accept that where Husserl talks about conscious 
beings as monads he is referring to what Leibniz calls 
spiritual monads, then the substantive parallels hold. 
For both theorists, the monad is a self-contained 
system of being, one “without windows”; a monad’s 
experiences unfold in harmonious concatenations; a 
monad is a mirror of its proximate environs and 
comprises multiple perspectives; the unconscious is a 
repository of potential activation; the necessity that 
explains why experiences endlessly unfold in 
harmony is due to “a divine formation”; and, most 
importantly of all, a monad knows no birth and death 
and hence is immortal. In his very last years, Husserl 
proposed a third ego level, below (or beyond) the 
mundane ego and transcendental ego – the primal 
ego. It is neither psychical nor physical; it permits the 
transcendental ego to carry out its constitutive 
activities, including the mundane ego’s birth and 
death in time; it is always in a process of becoming, 
and so it can never be in a state of only “having-
been”, that is, dead; and hence the primal ego’s 
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